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Kazu-Hiko Mikami 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to explain how players reach agreement in 
two-good bargaining. When there are more than two issues bargained 
over, al issues might not be settled simultaneously in practice. Some-
times the bargaining continues for a long time although the bargainers 
were agreed on some issues. 
Rubinstein (1982) shows that there exists a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium in his alternating-offer bargaining model. Although 
Rubinstein's model gives us a theoretical tool to study bargaining 
situations, it is not enough to explain delay, which often occurs in real 
bargaining. Many other researchers have tried to explain delay 
theoretically. The existence of private information has been considered 
as one source of delay. Other sources of delay have been pointed out in 
modified Rubinstein models (Muthoo (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer 
(1991)) with perfect information. 
We analyze Muthoo's bargaining model with two issues. Muthoo 
(1990) shows that there are multiple efficient subgame perfect equilibria 
in bargaining for one good without commitment. Here commitment 
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means that a player cannot change his mind after the opponent's accep-
tance of his offer. Absence of commitment can be interpreted as meaning 
that the bargain requires ratification. The introduction of a ratification 
process has nontrivial effects on the equilibrium outcomes. The addi-
tional option allow players to execute a punishment if a player deviates 
from an equilibrium strategy. Then multiple equilibria emerge. In another 
variant of Rubinstein's model, Fernandez and Glazer (1991) show that 
there exist not only efficient equilibria but also inefficient equilibria in a 
wage bargaining model where a union can choose the option "strike." 
Their model is different from bargaining with a ratification process, but 
the structure of their game has a kind of similarity to the ratification-
requirement model. That is, both models have an additional option after 
an offer and a response. Moreover, both the models give rise to multiple 
equilibria in contrast to Rubinstein's model. 
The assumption of multiple issues to be bargained over raises the pos-
sibility of sequential agreements. We frequently observe that items are 
settled one by one even though al items are bargained over eventually. 
We show that there exist three types of equilibria in bargaining over two 
items without commitment: efficient equilibria (therefore, simultaneous 
agreement), inefficient equilibria with simultaneous agreement and ineffi-
cient equilibria with sequential agreement. 
We study two-good alternating-offer bargaining models where players 
are allowed to accept only one of the allocations when allocations of 
both goods are offered. We investigate first equilibria in the model of 
bargaining with commitment in order to study the effect of the players' 
partial agreements on the equilibrium outcomes. Weinberger 0997) 
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derives the equilibria in such a bargaining model under the assumption of 
simultaneous implementation of the agreed offers. We study the 
equilibria under the assumption of sequential implementation. As in 
Weinberger (1997), the equilibrium outcome is the same as the outcome 
of Rubinstein (1982). 
Next, we study bargaining without commitments. We show first that 
there exists a stationary equilibrium. Then the existence of other 
equilibria that generate extreme allocations for players using the above 
stationary equilibrium strategies in subgames is shown. In addition, some 
other allocations can be supported by strategies that involve actions that 
generate an extremely low payoff for the player that deviates from a 
proposed path of play. That is, once we can show that there exist 
subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies that generate extremely high or 
low payoffs for the players, such behaviour can be used to prevent 
players from deviating from other proposed paths of play. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 two bargaining models, 
with commitment and without commitment, are presented. In section 3 
the model with commitment is analyzed. In sections 4 and 5, we derive 
efficient and inefficient equilibria for the model without commitment. 
2 The Model 
Player 1 and player 2 bargain over two items both of size 1. These 
items are called good X and good Y Denote the allocation to player 1 by 
(x, y). We consider two bargaining protocols. 
First, consider the protocol where players are committed to their 
proposals. In Rubinstein-style alternating offer bargaining, player 1 
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proposes the allocation of good X and good Y, (x, y), at the beginning of 
period 0. Player 2 responds to the offer by either accepting both 
allocations (A), by accepting only the allocation of good X (AX), by 
accepting only the allocation of good Y(A Y) or by rejecting both 
allocations (R). If player 2 chooses A, then the game ends. If player 2 
chooses AX, then they consume the quantities of good X at period O and 
player 2 proposes the allocation of good Y at period 1. If player 2 
chooses A Y, then they consume the quantities of good Y at period O and 
player 2 proposes the allocation of good X at period 1. If player 2 
chooses R, then player 2 proposes the allocations of both good X and 
good Y at period 1. Bargaining proceeds until al issues are settled. Let 
(1) 
this bargaining game beぴ
Second, we consider bargaining where the players are not committed 
to their proposals. Player 1 proposes the allocation of good X and good Y 
at the beginning of period 0. Player 2 responds by accepting both 
allocations (A), by accepting only the allocation of good X (AX), by 
accepting only the allocation of good Y(A Y), or by rejecting both 
allocations (R). If player 2 chooses A, then player 1 decides to accept or 
reject the acceptance of player 2's choice A by AXa (accepting only 
player 2's acceptance of the allocation of good X), A Ya (accepting only 
player 2's acceptance of the allocation of good Y), Aa (accepting player 
2's acceptance of both allocations of good X and good Y), or Ra (reject-
(2) 
ing player 2's acceptance A). Notice here that players are allowed to 
(1) Weinberger (1997) considers the same model under the assumption of simul-
taneous implementation. 
(2) Here actions are symbolized by large leters and the environment where the 
actions are taken is symbolized by small leters. 
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choose partial acceptance of acceptance of both allocations. Ifplayer 1 
chooses Aa, then the game ends. Ifplayer 1 chooses AXa (A Ya), then 
they consume only good X (Y) at period O and player 2 proposes the allo-
cation of good Y(X) at period 1. If player 1 chooses Ra, then player 2 
proposes the allocations of both good X and good Y at period 1. If player 
2 chooses AX (A Y) to player l's demand at period 0, then player 1 
decides to accept or reject the acceptance of player 2's choice AX (A Y) 
by A四 (Aay)or Rax(Ray). If player 1 chooses Aax(Aay), then they con-
sume only good X(Y) at period O and player 2 proposes the allocation of 
good Y(X) at period 1. If player 1 chooses Rax(Ray) then player 2 
proposes the allocations of both good X and good Y at period 1. Bargain-
(3) 
ing proceed until al issues are settled. Let this bargaining game be G. 
The players have instantaneous von-Neumann-Morgenstern linear util-
ity functions over the items X and Y, u戸 x+yand u2=1-x+1-y. We 
have assumed that the players consume a good immediately after 
agreement on it. Thus we assume the players'utility functions are U戸
炉 x十炉砂 andU戸 8冗 (1-x) + oTx (1-y), where yx and TY are the 
periods when the players reach agreement on the goods X and Y, 
respectively. Let Hbe the set of histories in the bargaining game. Let Cf= 
｛が} ~。 be a typical strategy of player 1 and -r= { -r'} ~ 。 a typical strat-
egy of player 2. Denote the action at time t byず (h(t)) andが(h(t)), 
where h (t) EH  isa history up to time t. Given strategies Cf and -r and a 
history h (t) in the bargaining game G (or Gり， denotethe strategies that 
(3) In both bargaining models cc and C we have assumed that players imple-
ment the agreement as soon as they reach it. Another possible assumption about 
implementation is that they implement only after they reach agreements of both 
goods. The difference is not trivial as pointed out by Busch and Horstmann (1996). 
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び andて inducein the subgame G(h(t)) (or cc(h(t))) by IJ"I h(t) and 
-r I h(t) , respectively. 
Our model has an advantage in terms of flexibility over other two-good 
bargaining models. In most of the existing literature; for example, 
Herrero (1989), Fershtman (1990), and Busch and Horstmann (1996), it 
is fixed whether players bargain over goods simultaneously or sequen-
tialy. In our model, which good is to be settled first is determined 
(4) 
endogenously. 
We will show that there are three types of subgame-perfect equilibria 
in G characterized by delay: 
Definition 1. An efficient outcome means that players reach agreement 
on both allocations at the beginning of the game. An inefficient outcome 
with simultaneous agreement means that players reach an agreement on 
both goods simultaneously after a delay in the bargaining. An inefficient 
outcome with sequential agreement means that players reach agreements 
one by one. 
In Definition 1 the efficiency is judged by when they reach an 
agreement. There is another criterion of efficiency: efficiency in terms of 
the agreed allocation. However, al possible outcomes except no 
agreement satisfy this. 
3 Commitment Case 
In this section we show that there exits an (essentially) unique 
(4) Lang and Rosenthal (1998) also propose a flexible bargaining model. Their 
bargaining procedure, however, is different from ours. Their model allows 
partial offers rather than the partial agreements in our model. 
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subgame perfect equilibrium in the bargaining game with commitment. 
"Essentially unique" means that al equilibria lead to the same equilib-
rium utilities. The result is the same as the bargaining model where a 
responder can choose only "Yes" or "No" to the bundled offers. Thus the 
modification of the bargaining procedure to allow for partial agreements 
does not affect the equilibrium utilities. 
Proposition 1. Immediate agreement on the generalized Rubinstein 
bargaining outcome, x + y = 2/ (1 + o) is the essentially unique subgame 
Perfect equilibガumin bargaining game c. 
Proof First we show that the stationary strategies below constitute a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. Let h (t) be any history where both goods 
remain at period t Let h (t',t) be any history where either good X or Y 
remains at period t and where the other good was settled at period t' 
(t'< t) 
Consider the following strategy CJ'of player 1. Let t be an even number. 
When both goods remain, 
叫 (t))=(1 1) 
1+0'1+0・ 
Let t be an odd number. When both goods remain and the allocation (x, 
y) is offered, 
o o 
A if x~ ―-andy~ 一―
1+0 1+0 
o o 









If X< — andy<-
l+o 1十か
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Let t~t'+ 1 be any number. When only one good remains, 
alh(t', t)=am lh(t', t) for any period t, 
where <J"R1 I h(t', t) means the unique equilibrium strategy for player 1 in 
one-good alternating-offer bargaining (Rubinstein (1982)) beginning from 
period t. Thus player 1 follows the stationary equilibrium strategy that 
generates 1/ (1 + o) or al (1 + o) for player 1 depending upon whether tis 
even or odd, given that player 2 plays the stationary strategy. 
Consider the following strategy -r of player 2. Let t be an odd number. 
When both goods remain, 
が (h(t))=(1!0•占）．
Let t be an even number. When both goods remain and the allocation (x, 



















































































Let t 2:t'+ 1 be any number. When only one good remains, 
て1I h (t', t)=て1,lh(t', t) for any period t, 
where rm I h(t', t) means the unique equilibrium strategy for player 2 in 
the one-good alternating-offer bargaining game. 
We prove that the above strategies constitute a subgame perfect equi-
(5) 
librium using the one-deviation principle. Notice that after an agreement 
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on one good, the continuation game is exactly the same as Rubinstein's 
alternating-offer bargaining model due to the assumptions of sequential 
implementation and separable utilities. Thus the pair of induced 
strategies (びmlh(t',t), 叫 h(t', t) constitutes the unique sub game 
perfect equilibrium in al sub games starting at h (t', t)for any t~t'+ 1. 
Consider a subgame beginning with player l's demand after h (t). We 
show that player l's deviation from demanding (1/ (1 + o), 1/ (1 + o)) 
does not pay when both good remain. When player 1 demands x> 1/ (1+ 
o) and y= 1/ (1 + o), then according to player 2's strategy, he accepts 
only the allocation of good Y. Then he offers x= a/ (1+ o) (which is 
accepted by player 1) at the next period. So player 1 would get o(o/ (1 + 
o)) +1/(1+0) = (1十が）/ (1 + o) < 2/ (1 + o) by the deviation. Thus the 
deviation is not profitable. If player 1 demands x=l/(l+o) and 
y > 1/ (1 + o), then the argument is the same as the above case. If player 1 
demands x> 1/ (1+ o) and y> 1/ (1 + o), then player 2 rejects the demand 
and counteroffers (o/ (1 + o), al (1 + o)) which is accepted by player 1 at 
the next period. Thus player 1 would get (2が）/ (1 + a)く2/(1 + o) in this 
case. Thus the deviation of player 1 is not profitable given player 2's 
strategy -r. 
Next we consider a deviation of player 2 after player 1 demanded (x, 
y) = (1/ (1 + o), 1/ (1 + o)). According to player 2's strategy, he accepts 
the demand and gets (2o) / (1 + o). If he rejects both demands, he offers 
(o/ (1+ o), al (1+ o)) as player l's share, which is accepted by player 1 
at the next period. Thus he would get (2o) / (1 + o), which is worse. If 
(5) In general, the one-deviation property does not hold in infinite horizon 
games, but standard arguments show that it holds here. 
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player 2 accepts only the allocation of good X, he offers y= o/ (1 + o)as 
player l's share, which is accepted by player 1 at the next period. Thus 
player 2 would get (2o) / (1 + o). If player 2 accepts only the allocation of 
good Y, he gets (2o) / (1 + o). Thus player 2 cannot deviate profitably 
given player l's strategy. 
Similarly, in subgames beginning with player 2's offer, both players 
cannot deviate profitably. Thus the above strategies constitute a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Next we show that any subgame perfect equilibrium strategy combina-
tion generates the same equilibrium payoffs. Let G7 (h) be a subgame 
starting with player z's offer, where h is the history where both goods 
remain. That (a-, 1:) is subgame perfect in the above discussion allow us 
to define 
M;= sup {炉： there is an SPE of G ,'with outcome (x, y, t) } 
and 
m; = mf { 01-1: there is an SPE of G「withoutcome (x, y, t) 
We will show 
M1=m1=M2=m2 
Step l Suppose that at the first period in Gg (h), player 2 make an 






From the definition of M1, player l's strategy must specify action A 
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.i 百 -----------------_: --------------- D 
X2 
Note: Player 1 chooses A Y after (x2, y2) in AB is offered. Player 1 chooses A after (x, y,) 。
&
 百 ー
in BC is offered. Player 1 chooses AX after (ふ沿 inCD is offered. Player 2 choose the 
point B among points in AB in SPE. Player 2 choose the point C among points in CD in 
SPE. 
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For any SPE in G~, player 2 must obtain at least min (1 -x叶 1-yz)
where (xz, Y2) satisfies (1) by playing the equilibrium strategy. 
Otherwise, at the beginning of G~, making the offer (x2, yz) by which min 
(1-X2 + 1 -Y2) is achieved would be an equilibrium offer. (Such an offer 
must be accepted by player 1 in any SPE.) The offers that achieve the 
minimum of (1-x叶 1-Y2) satisfy x叶 Y2=&机， Y2紅 /(1 + o)'and X2~ 
o/ (1 + o). See Figure 1. Thus player 2 obtains at least 2-0M1 in any SPE 
of G~. From the definition of m2, 
m2~2-6M1. (2) 







Omz> 1-yl +ーl+o・ 
From the definition of m2 Any player 2's equilibrium strategy in G?(h) 
must specifies that player 2 should reject such a offer. By making an 
offer satisfying (3) 
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0 
Om 2~1-X J + 
l+o 
(3) 




player 2 chooses R. If players reach agreement on both goods at the 
beginning of periods in Cf, player 1 must obtain at most max (xげ叫 by












Note: Player 2 chooses A Y after (xぃy,)in AB is offered. Player 2 chooses A after (x, 叫
in BC is offered. Player 2 chooses AX after (x, y,) in CD is offered. Player 1 choose the 
point B among points in AB in SPE. Player 1 choose the point C among points in CD in 
SPE 
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making the offer that achieves the maximum of x1 + y1 where (xぃ叫
satisfies (3) would be an equilibrium offer. The offers that achieve the 
maximum of (x1 +y1) satisfy om2=2-x1―Yi, om22'.l-x,+o/O+o), and 
om2 2: 1-Y1 + o I (1+ o). See Figure 2. Thus player 1 can obtain at most 
2-om2 in any SPE of Gr. Suppose that players do not reach agreement 
on both goods at the beginning of periods of Gr in equilibrium. If that 
player 2 chooses R at the beginning of period of Gr is SPE in Gr, player 
1 can obtain at most o(2-m1). If that player 2 chooses AX at the 
beginning of period of Gr is SPE in Gr, player 1 can obtain at most x叶
o/ (1 + o). Here X1 satisfies x,:,; 1 + (o/ (1 + o)) -omz. If that player 2 
chooses A Y at the beginning of period of Gr is SPE in Gr, player 1 can 
obtain at most y叶 o/(1 + o). Here Y1 satisfies y,:,; 1 + (o/ (1 + o)) -omz. 
From 2—蝕>2(2-m1) and 2—晒>I+ (o/(l+o))-omけ o/O+o),
player 1 obtain at most 2-om2 in any SPE. Thus from the definition of 
Mi, in any SPE, 
M1:o;2-om2. (4) 
Replacing the roles of player 1 and player 2, we get 
m12'.2-0M2 (5) 
M2:o;2-om1. (6) 
From (2) , (4) , (5) , (6) , M心尻， andM亨加， wehave 
M1=叫 =M2=mz.
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1 shows that the introduction of partial agreements does 
not influence the structure of equilibria in the sense that players get the 
same equilibrium utilities as Rubinstein's. 
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4 Efficient Equilibria in the No Commitment Model 
In this section we show that there exist efficient multiple equilibria in 
the bargaining without commitment. 
4 .1 Muthoo's One Good Model 
In bargaining over two items, after agreement on one good, the 
subgame after the agreement is exactly the same as Muthoo's model due 
to the assumptions of sequential implementation and separable utilities. 
We need his no delay-efficient results later to prove our results, so we 
cite his results for convenience below. 
Lemma} 1 (Muthoo (1990)). In bargaining over one good, any allocation 
with no delay can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibガumfor sufficient-
ly large discount factor. 
In addition, the no -delay equilibガumoutcomes are classified as follows. 
(MR) The allocation x= 1/ (1 + o) is a subgame Peガectequilibガumalloca-
tionfor any昨 (0,1) when player I isthe first proposer. 
(Mh) The allocation x= I isa subgame perfect equilibガumallocation for any 
如 1/✓2, l) when player I isthe first proposer. 
(Ml) The allocation x=O is a subgame peifect equilibガumallocation for any 
和 1/ ft, 1) when player 1 isthe first proposer. 
(Mhb) The allocation x=l is a subgame peガectequilibガumallocation for 
any庭 (1/ft, 1) when player 2 is the first proposer. 
(M lb) The allocation x = 0 is a subgame perfect equilibガumallocation for 
any oE(1/⑫ l) when player 2 isthe first proposer. 
(M) Any allocation x~(0, 1) is a subgame perfect equilibガumfor any 
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如 1/fi, 1) when player 1 1sthe first proposer. 
Muthoo first showed that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium 
that generates the result of type (MR). Then using those (induced) 
strategies in subgames, he showed that there exist subgame perfect 
equilibria that generate extreme allocations such as type (Mh), (MI), 
(Mhb), and (Mlb) when the players are sufficiently patient. Then using 
strategies that generate such extreme allocations as punishments after 
deviations, he showed that al allocations are subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcomes. 
Letび，:and T; be equilibrium strategies that implement any of the 
above equilibrium outcomes, where i=MR, Mh, Ml, Mhb, Mlb and M. For 
example, 年 meansplayer l's strategy that implements the result x= 
1/ (1 + o) if player 2 uses TMR in the subgame where only good X remains. 
These equilibrium strategies will be used below when we construct 
subgame perfect equilibria in the two good game. In particular, the equi-
librium strategies that lead to the extreme allocations (Mh), (MI), 
(Mhb), and (Mlb), will be used to prevent deviations. 
4. 2 Two Goods 
Muthoo's results can be extended to the two-good case using the same 
logic as his. As in Muthoo (1990), we will first show the existence of sta-
tionary equilibrium strategies, then of equilibrium strategies that gener-
ate extreme allocations, and then of equilibrium strategies that generate 
other allocations. 
Lemma 2 (Rubinstein). The generalized Rubinstein bargaining outcome 
(x, y) = (1/ (1 + o), 1/ (1 + o)) is a subgame perfect outcome equilibガum.
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Proof We show (x, y)=(l/(l+o), 1/0+o)) is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome as in Proposition 1. 
Consider the following strategy <r of player 1. Let t be an even number. 
When both goods remain, 
a'(h(t))=(土出）．
When both goods remain and player 2 responds by AX, A Y, or A to the 
offer (x, y), 
02 
a'(h (t),(x, y), AX)=Aax if x~ 
l+o' 
が




AXa if x~ Ho 
02 
A Ya if y~ Ho 
Aa ifx予伍andy疇凸(orx+y予昌）
02 が 2oz
Ra ifx< l+oandy<W(orx+y< l十砂




if x2': ー一 andy2':一―
1+0 1+0 
6 6 
AX if x 2: and y < 
1+6 1+6 







ifx< and y< 
1+0 1+0・ 
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Let t;:; t'+ 1 be any period. When only one good remains, 
a I h (t', t) =aMR I h (t', t) for any t;:;t'+ 1. 
Remember that h (t', t) is the history where either good X or good Y 
remains at period t and where the other good was settled at period t'< t 
Consider the following strategy r of player 2. Let t be an odd number. 
When both goods remain, 
r'(h (t)) = (_§_ 0) 
l十が l+o.
Let t be an even number. When both goods remain and player 1 responds 
by AX, A Y, or A to the offer (x, y), 
r'(h (t)'(X'y)'AX) = Aax if X :5
0 
l+o' 
r'(h(t), (x,y),AY)=Aay ify:5 
0 
l+o' 
AXa if x:5 
0 
I+o 




,Aa if x :5__§_ and y三ー(orx+y:5252 
1+0 1+0 1+0) 
Ra ifx> 0 and y>~(orx+y>竺
1+0 1+0 1+0). 
Let t be even number. When both goods remain and (x, y) is offered, 
A 
1 1 
If X$ — andy$ — 
1+0 1+0 
ず(h(t), (x , y)) = 
1 1 
AX if x:5 —- andy> 
1+0 1+0 
1 1 
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Let t 2: t'+ 1 be any period. When only one good remains, 
て¥h(t', t)=てし11I h (t', t) for any t 2: t'+ 1. 
It is easy to see that the above strategies constitute a subgame perfect 
equilibrium using the one-deviation principle. Q. E. D. 
Let年 and"l'R2 be the strategies constructed in the proof of Lemma 2. 
Using Lemma 2, extreme allocations such as (1, 1) and (0, 0) are 
supported as the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Lemma 3. The allocation (x, y) = (1, 1) is a subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome for o E (1噂，1).
Proof A subgame after a partial agreement on either good X or good 
Y is exactly the same as Muthoo (1990). Let the discount factor that 
Figure 3: Equilibrium Outcome (1, 1): On the Equilibrium Path 
胄
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Outcome (1, 1): Player 2's Deviation 
(2) 
period 1• 0 
(x,y) 
0~x < l 






























J(l -X + l -y) 
炉(1)+Jy 









supports the equilibrium allocation x = 1 or y = 1 when only one good 
remains beふE(1/且1)'
Consider the subgames where player 2 has offered xE(o, 1) and yE 
(o, 1) which is accepted by A, AX or A Y, and then player 2 rejects player 
l's acceptance. Let t be the period after the above subgame. Thus both 
goods stil remain at period t.Denote the situation where only good X 
remains byが (t',t) where good Ywas settled at period t', and the situa-
tion where only good Y remains byが(t',t) where good X was settled at 
period t'. 
Consider the following strategy <Y of player 1 (see Figure 3 and 4.) Let 
t be an even number. When both goods remain, 
a'(h(t))=(l, 1) for t=O, 2, .. 
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When both goods remain and player 2 responds by A, AX, A Y to the 
demand (x, y) , 
a'(h(t),(x,y),A)=Aa ifx尋 andy尋；
a'(h (t), (x, y), AX) =Aax if x尋；
a'(h (t), (x, y), AY) =Aay if y尋．
Let t be an odd number. When both goods remain and (x, y) is offered by 
player 2, 
a'(h (t) , (x, y)) = A if x = l and y = 1. 
When both goods remain and the period is t~t, 
a I h (t)=ad h (t) for any td. 
When only one good remains, 
alが(t',t)=a.wh lh(t', t) for any t~t'+l; 
a I hr (t', t) = a wh I h (t', t) for any t~t'+ 1. 
Consider the following strategy -r of player 2. Let t be an odd number. 
When both goods remain, 
て'(h(t))=(l, 1). 
When both goods remain and player 1 responds by A, AX, or A Y to the 
offer (x,y), 
ず(h(t) , (x , y) , A) = Aa if x = 1 or x < o and y = 1 or y < o; 
ず(h(t), (x, y), AX) =Aax if x= 1 or x<o; 
ず(h(t), (x, y), AY) =Aay if y= 1 or y<o. 
Let t be an even number. When both goods remain and (x, y) is offered 
by player 1, 
ず(h(t), (x, y)) = A if x~0 and y~0. 
When both goods remain and the period is t~t, 
てlh(t)=てd h (t) for any t~i. 
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When only one good remains, 
て1が (t',t) =て、whI h (t', t) for any t~t'+ 1 
r/hY(t', t)=r.wh/h(t', t) for any t~t'+l. 
Of course, player 1 does not want to deviate because she gets the maxi-
mum payoff. Consider player 2's deviation where he offers (x, y) with o:5 
x < I and o:5 y < 1.Notice at period i,if 
州匂ぶ）> sup (1-x+l-y)=(l-o)+(l-o), 
that is, o> 1 / 2, then player 2 rejects player l's acceptance of both goods 
at period t-1 even though player 2 deviates to get payoff more than 0. 
Similarly, if 
a( o o 1+6+ 1十叶>sup (1-x)= 1-o 
and 
a(占+1!叶>sup (1-y)= 1-o, 
that is, o> 1 /蒻，thenplayer 2 rejects player l's partial acceptance AX or 
A Y at period t-1. If the discount factor o satisfies that 
1 
o(l+l)>o(l+o十占），
that is, o>O, then player 1 rejects player 2's offer. Thus if o> 1 /✓2, 
player 2 does not profit by deviating. Other deviations by player 2 result 
in zero payoffs for player 2. Letふ bethe minimum common discount 
factor such that both players do not profitably deviate when both goods 
are not settled. Letが=max{ふ，ふ}. Then o• = 1 /且 Thusfor any 
腟 (1/ 2,1), (1, 1) is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Q. E. D. 
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Let IYh and rh be the equilibrium strategies constructed in the proof of 
Lemma 3. 
Using the same logic as Lemma 3 we can show the following lemmas. 
Lemma 4. The allocation (x, y) = (0, 0) is a subgame Peガectequilibガum
outcome for腟 (1/Jz, 1). 
Let /Yi andて1be the strategies constructed in Lemma 4. 
Lemma 5. If player 2 is the first proposer, then the allocation (x, y) = (1, 1) 
is a subgame peガectequilibrium outcome for o E(1 / Jz, 1). 
Letびゅ and-rゅ bethe equilibrium strategies constructed in Lemma 5. 
Lemma 6. If player 2 is the first proposer, the allocation (x, y) = (0, 0) is a 
subgame peガectequilibガumoutcome for腟 (1/丘，1).
Letびlband rib be the equilibrium strategies constructed in Lemma 6. 
Next we show that other allocations are also subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcomes using the above lemmas. These equilibria are efficient 
because players reach agreement simultaneously at the beginning of the 
bargaining. We construct players'strategies in the following way: Sup-
pose that a path of actions is given. 
(C) Class of strategies: If a proposer deviates from the path, the oppo-
nent rejects the offer and punishes the proposer so severely that proposer 
(6) 
receives zero payoff after the deviation. 
First, we construct strategies satisfying the above conditions, then 
show that such strategies can be subgame perfect equilibrium. 
p ropos1tion 2. Every (え， y)that satisfies 
y<-x+2o (7) 
(6) Such "grim" strategies have been used in infinitely repeated games to obtain 
Nash and subgame perfect equilibrium. 
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2o> l+y (IO) 
20> 1十え (I I) 
is the outcome of an efficient equilibガumfor o E ((-1 +品）I 2,1) 
Proof. On the path (え， y),A, Aa), players reach the agreement (ぇ y)
immediately. We construct strategies satisfying (C). First we specify 
players'actions after player 1 demands (え， y)at period 0, and then 
actions in al subgames after player 1 demands (x, y)キ（え， y)at period 0. 
See Figure 5, which depicts the players'actions on the proposed path of 





































8(1 + 1) 元+8(出） 8(1 + 1) 8(由） +ii 
8(0 + 0) {l一元） +8(由） 8(0 + 0) 8(由） +1-/j 
Note: Bold lines represents players'optimal behavior ifが/(1+0)<ぇ<(2が＋が）/(1+0) 
andが/(1+0)<Jく (26十が）/(1+0). 
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play. Consider the following strategies in subgames G (h (1)). Given that 
が(0)= (元， y),
al(えふ），R)=ahblh(1) てI(え，y),R)=叫 h(l) 
al(え，5i),AX.Rax)=叫 h(1) てI(え，y),AX,Rax)=叫 h(l) 
al(えふ），AX,Aax)=aし/Rlh(0, 1) -rl(ほ，y),AX,Aax)=,Mnlh(O,1) 
al(えふ），AY,Ray)=ahblh(l) -rl(えふ），AY,Ray)=叫 h(l)
al(えふ），AY,Aay)=aA/Rlh(0, 1) てI(え，y),AY,Aay)=-r叫h(0, 1) 
al(え，夕），A,Ra)=a1blh(l) -rl(豆），A,Ra)=叫 h(1) 
al(え，y),A,AXa)=a,1nlh(O,l) -rl(えふ），A,AXa)=芦 lh(0, 1) 
al(えふ），A.AYa)= a.wnlh (0, 1) てI(え，y),A,AYa)=てMnlh(0, 1). 
Here, for example, <JI (え， y),R) =叫h(1) means that player 1 plays 
砂 fromperiod 1, replacing period tin the original strategy砂 witht+l. 
Similarly we construct player 2's strategies as follows. For any h (1), 
-rlh(l) =て11h (1) where j satisfies <1 h (1) = <1 I h(I). That is, we construct 
strategies that constitute subgame perfect equilibrium from period 1. 
After period 0, the above induced strategies constitute the subgame 
perfect equilibrium in the subgame G(h(l)) from Muthoo's and our pre-
vious results. Let us check that the moves of (え， y),A, Aa) are players' 
best responses. See Figure 5. Ifぇ(ory) < (2o十cf-)I (1+ o), then player 1 
chooses Rax(Ray) after player 2's acceptance AX(AY). Ifぇ>o(o/(1 + 
o)) and y>o(o/(l+o), then player 1 chooses Aa after player Z's accep-
tance A. Ifが/O+o)<ぇく (Zo十が）/(l+o)andが/O+o)<yく (2o+が）
/ (1 + o), then player 2 chooses A after player l's demand (え， y).Thus the 
above behavior is best response on the equilibrium path as long as (え， y)
satisfies the above conditions. 
Next we consider behavior after player 1 demands (x, y)キ（ぇ y).
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叩 +l) x+疇） fi(l + 1) 庫（出） +y 
fi(O + 0) (1 -x) + fi(由） fi(O+O) 妬（由） +1-y 
Note: We have supposed that player 1 deviates from demanding (え， j)at period 0. Bold lines 
represents players'optimal behavior if o > (-I+品）/2, が/(l+o)<え，が/(I +o) <y, and o> 
l /2. 
Case 1 (See Figure 6): Suppose that player 1 demands (x, y) at period 
0, where x:2'. 又andy 2'.y. 
a0(0)=(x,y), wherex:2: えandy:2: タ，
and 
al((x,y),R)=叫 h(1) 
al((x ,Y) ,AX.Rax)=叫 h(l)
てl((x,y},R)=てtblh(1) 
rl((x ,y) ,AX.Rax)=叫 h(1) 
al((x ,Y) ,AX,Aax) =awRlh (0, 1) rl((x ,Y) ,AX,Aax) =て1,mlh(O,1) 
al((x ,Y),AY,Ray) =ahblh (1) 
al((x ,Y),AY,Aay) =a1111lh (0, 1) rl((x ,y),AY,Aay) =r叫h(O,1) 
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al((x ,y) ,A,AXa) =a叫 h(0, 1) てl((x,y) ,A,AXa) = -r, し,i/h(0, 1) 




i.e., if o>(-1+品）I 2, then player 1 chooses Rax (Ray) after player 2 
chooses AX  (A Y) . 
If y>が/(l+o),andぇ＞が/(1 + o), then player 1 chooses Aa after player 
2 chooses A. If 
2o> sup {l-x+l-y}=2一えータ，
then player 2 chooses Rafter player 1 demands (x, y). However, if o> 1/ 












































x+&(出） '5(1+ 1)'5(出） +y 
(1-x) +&(出） '5(0+0)'5(中） +1-y 
Note: Bold lines represents players'optimal behavior if 6 > (-1 + /5) / 2, 茂く (26+が）/(1+6), 
§く(26+6')!(1+6),26>x+I and 26> I十y.
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2, then we can ignore the condition y>―ぇ+2-2ふ
Case 2 (See Figure 7): Suppose that player 1 demands (x, y) at period 
0, where x2".xand y:-:;y. 
が(0)= (x, y), where x 2".えandy合，
and 
al((x,y),R)=四 lh(1) てl(x,y) ,R) = r1blh (1) 
al((x ,y) ,AX.Rax)=叫 h(l) rl((x,y),AX,Rax)=ahblh(l) 
al((x ,Y) ,AX,Aax) =a 11lh (0, 1) rl((x ,Y) ,AX,Aax) =aM11lh (0, 1) 
al((x ,y),AY,Ray)=ahblh (1) rl((x,y),AY,Ray)=叫 h(l)
al((x ,Y) ,A Y,Aay) =aAtRlh (0, 1) rl((x ,Y) ,AY,Aay) = r,itRlh (0, 1) 
al((x,y),A,Ra)=叫 h(l) rl((x,y),A,Ra)=叫 h(1) 
al((x,y),A,AXa)=a叫h(0, 1) てl((x,y),A,AXa)=rw11lh (0, 1) 
al((x,y),A,AYa)=a1111lh(O, 1) rl((x,y),A,AYa)=芦 lh(O,1). 
If (-1 + ./5) / 2, then player 1 chooses Rax after player 2 choose AX. If 
2o>sup{~+y}=互サ
1+0 1+0 
i.e., ifyく(2o十が）/ (1 + o), then player 1 chooses Ray after player 2 
chooses AY  If o>(-1+)5)/2ふく(2o十が）/(l+o) and 2o> l+y, then 
player 1 chooses Ra after player 2 chooses A. Player 2 chooses R after 
player 1 demands (x, y) , where x 2:ぇandy:;y. 
Case 3 (See Figure 7): Suppose that player 1 demands (x, y) at period 
0, where x豆 andy砂
が(0)= (x, y), where x :5えandy窃，
and 
ol((x,y),R)=叩 lh(1) てl((x,y),R)=叫 h(l) 
ol((x ,Y) ,AX.Rax)=叫 h(l) てl(x,y) ,AX.Rax)=叫 h(1) 
92 
If 
甲南経営研究第43巻第 4号 (2003.3) 
al((x ,y) ,AX,Aax) =a¥1ulh (0, 1) rl((x,y) ,AX,Aax) =a,mlh (0, 1) 
al((x ,y) ,AY,Ray)=ahblh (1) てl((x,y) ,A Y,Ray) =叫h(1) 
al((x ,Y) ,AY,Aay) =aしmlh(0, 1) てl((x,Y) ,A Y,Aay) = r1mlh (0, 1) 
al((x,y),A,Ra)=a』h(l) rl((x,y),A,Ra)=叫 h(1) 
al((x,y),A,AXa)=a叫h(O,l) rl((x,y),A,AXa)=り lh(O,1) 
al((x ,y) ,A,AYa)=a¥1lh (0, 1) rl((x,y),A,AYa)=てし1lh(0, 1). 
2o>sup{x二｝＝え＋互
1+0 1+0 
e.g., ifぇく (2o十が）/ (1 + o), then player 1 chooses Rax after player 2 
chooses AX. If 
2o>sup{ 1~20 +y }=畠+l
i.e., o>(-1+丘）I 2,then player 1 chooses Ray after player 2 chooses A Y 
Ifぇ<(26十が）/(1+0), o>(-1疇）/2 and 26>え+l,and Zo>又+l,then 
player 1 chooses Ra after player 2 chooses A. Then player 2 chooses R 
after player 1 demands (x, y) , where x Sぇandy紅
Case 4 (See Figure 8): Suppose that player 1 demands (x, y) at period 
0, where x豆 andySy. 
and 
a0(0)=(x,y), wherexsえandySy,
al((x ,y) ,R) =a1blh (1) rl((x ,y) ,R) =叫h(1) 
al((x ,Y) ,AX.Rax)=叫 h(1) てl((x,Y) ,AX.Rax)=叫 h(1) 
al((x,y),AX,Aax)=a¥1/ilh (0, 1) rl((x,y),AX,Aax)=r,11lh (0, 1) 
al((x ,Y) ,AY,Ray) =叫h(1) てl((x,y) ,AY,Ray) =叫h(l)
al((x,y),AY,Aay)=aMRlh(O, 1) てl((x,Y) ,AY,Aay) =て11lh(0, 1)
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Figure 8: Case 4: Player l's Deviation 
り
(x,y) -=f (元，y)


















































































fJ(l+l) x+fi(由） fJ(l + 1) fJ(由）+y 
fJ(O + 0) (1 -x) + fi(由） fJ(O+O) fJ(由）+1-y 
Note: Bold lines represents players'optimal behavior ifが/(1+0)<えく (2o十が）/(1+0), 
が/(1+0)<yく(2o十が/(l+o),and Zo>ぇ+y.
al((x,y),A,Ra)=叫 h(1) てl((x,y),A,Ra)=叫 h(l)
al((x,y),A,AXa)=aしmlh(O,1) rl((x,y),A,AXa)=て叫h(0, 1) 




e.g., ifぇく (2o十が）/ (1 + o), then player 1 chooses Rax after player 2 
chooses AX. If yく (2o十が）/ (1 + o), then player 1 chooses Ray after 
player 2 chooses A Y If 2o>ぇ+y,x>が/(l+o)and y>が/(l+o),then 
player 1 chooses Ra. Then player 2 chooses R after player 1 demands (x, 
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y), where x :5ぇandy :5y. 
Optimal behavior: After player 1 demands (え， _y)'if
が 2o+が
l+o ＜え＜ l+o 
が 2o十が
l+o <y< l+o 
and が E(l/✓2,1) (to use Muthoo's results and lemmas), then both 
players would agree on (ぇ _y)immediately. From Cases 1-4, player 1 














Thus no player wants to deviate when both goods remain ifえ， jiand 
o satisfy the above conditions. 
Letふ bethe minimum common discount factor such that neither 
player intends to deviate when both goods remain. Let o= max {ふ，ふ｝．
Notice if o > (-1+ J5) / 2> 1 / 2, then (Z<J十が）/ (1 + a)> 1.Thus any allo-
cation (え， ji) satisfying(7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) is a subgame 
perfect equilibrium outcome for o E ((-1 +且）/2,1). Q.E.D. 
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Figure 9: Efficient Equilibrium Outcome (え， y)
fj 
＇ 






° 羞 ½1 元
Note: The shaded area is the equilibrium outcome (え， y),where we have assumed o = 3 I 4 > 
(-!+且）I 2. Then equations (7) , (8) , (9) , (10), are (11) reduced to Ji— ぇ+3/2, ぇ>9/
28, J>9/28, J<l/2, andぇく1/2.
For example, Figure 9 depicts the region of the subgame perfect equi-
librium outcomes described in Proposition 2 for o= 3/ 4. 
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5 Inefficient Equilibria 
In this section we discuss inefficient equilibria in the bargaining game 
without commitment. 
Recall that yx is the period when agreement on good X has just 
occurred and TY is the period when agreement on good Y has just 
occurred. We show that there exist two types of inefficient equilibria. 
1. TX= TY>O. 
2. Tx> TY or TY> Tx. 
Type 1 is called a simultaneous agreement equilibrium. Type 2 is 
called sequential agreement (therefore, inefficient) equilibria. 
5. 1 Inefficient Equilibria with Simultaneous Agreement 
Proposition 3. There exists an inefficient equilibガumwith simultaneous 
agreement if o issuficiently large. 
Proof Let (i, y) E (0, 1)x (0, 1). Let yx = yv = T> 0. Suppose that Tis 
an even number. (The case that T is an odd number can be handled 
similarly.) We construct the equilibrium where both players delay the 
bargaining until period T Player 1 continues to demand (1, 1)and player 
2 continues to offer (0, 0) in the earlier periods. Both players reject these 
offers. Player 1 demands (i, y) at period T, then player 2 accepts the 
demand and then player 1 accepts player Z's acceptance. Let us check 
that the above behavior is the equilibrium path of a subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome. Let h* be the above path. See Figure 10. 
First we specify players'optimal behavior on the proposed path of play 
が.Then players'behavior off the proposed path of player is specified so 
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Figure 10: Inefficient Equilibrium with Simultaneous Agreement 
(2) (~:,. 1) 
d:,O) 
Note: Bold lines represent players'optimal behavior ifが/(l+ol<ぇく (2o+が）/(l+o) and 
8ツO+ol<J<(Zo十が）/(l+o). 
that every deviation does not pay. 
5. 1. 1. On the equilibrium path 
P/,ayers'optimal behavior at peガodT: See Figure 10 
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a「(h*(t))=(え， y),
a I (h *(T),(l, l),R) =a叫h*(T+l)
a I (h *(T), (1, l),AX,Rax) =ahb I h *(T+l) 
and 
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a I (h *(T), (1, l),AX,Aax) =aw1 I h (T, T+l) 
a I (h *(T), (1, l),AY,Ray) =ahb I h *(T+l) 




てI(h *(T),(1, 1),R) =てhblh*(T+l)
てI(h *(T),(1, 1),AX,Rax) =てhblh*(T+l)
r I (h *(T),(1, 1),AX,Aax)=てし111lh(T,T+l)
てI(h *(T),(l, l),AY,Ray) =てhblh*(T+l)
r I (h *(T),(l, l),AY,Aay)=て1111lh(T,T+l)
てI(h *(T),(1, 1),A,Ra) =五 lh*(T+l)
てl(h*(T),(1,1),A,AXa) =てWIII h (T'T +I) 
rl(h*(T),(1,1),A,AYa) =てWRI h (T, T + 1). 
If 2o>え+o(o/ (1 + o)), i.e., x< o(2+ o) / (1+ o), then player 1 chooses 
R四 afterplayer 2 chooses AX  If2o >炉+o(o/(l+o)),i.e., 5)<o(2+o)/ 
(1 + o), then player 1 chooses Ray after player 2 chooses A Y. If 5)> o(o/ 
(1 + o)) and x> o(o/ (1 + o)), then player 1 chooses Aa after player 2 
chooses A. If x and j) satisfies the above conditions, player 2 chooses A 
after player 1 demands (え， j).
Players'optimal behavior on the proposed path of play: See Figure 1. For 
t=O, 2, . , T-2, 
が(h*(t))=(l, 1), 
al(h*(t),(1,1),R) =alh*(t+l) 
a I (h *(t), (1,1) ,AX.Rax) =a I h *(t+ 1) 
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Figure 11: On the equilibrium path at period t= 0, 2,…, T-2 
period t-Q(l) 
(1, 1) 
~(ら十 y) R (2) A 
1 + 1 
+o 
&(1) 








1 + &(1) 
0 + &(O) 
『（ら +y)
釘1ーら+1-y) 
釘ら+y) l+o(l) o噂 +y) o(l) + 1 
炉(1-i; + 1-yり+o(O) 『(1-ら+1-~(O) +0 
a I (h *(t), (1, 1) ,AX,Aax) =a,1hb I h(t, t+ 1) 
a I (h *(t), (1, 1) ,AY,Ray) =a I h *(t+ 1) 
a I (h*(t), (1, 1) ,AY,Aay) =aMhb I h(t, t+l) 
al(h*(t).(1,1).A,Ra) =alh*(t+l) 
a I (h *(t),(l, l),A,AXa) =aMhb I h (t,t+l) 
a I (h *(t), (1, 1) ,A,A Ya) =aMhb I h (t ,t+ 1) 
てI(h *(t).(l, l),R) ＝て lh*(t+l)
てI(h *(t), (1, l),AX,Rax) =て lh*(t+l)
r I (h *(t},(l, l),AX,Aax)=てWhbI h (t. t + 1) 
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, I (h*(t),(l, 1),AY,Ray) =,lh *(t+l) 
,I (h *(t),(l, l),AY,Aay)=て¥1hbI h (t, t + 1)
てI(h *(t),(l, I),A,Ra) =て lh*(t+l)
てl(h*(t),(1,1),A,AXa) =て¥1hbI h (t, t + 1)
てI(h *(t),(l, l),A,AYa) =て¥1hbI h (t, t + 1). 
As long asが(1-£+1-y)>O, player 2 chooses Rat period t. 
Otherwise, player 2 gets zero payoffs by choosing A, AX, and A Y 
5. 1. 2 Off the equilibrium path 
Player l's deviation from demanding (x, y) = (1, 1) at peガod0: Next con-
sider players'induced strategies off the (supposed) equilibrium path. 
First we consider player l's deviation from demanding (x, y) = (1, 1) at 
Figure 12: Player l's Deviation at period t 
period←→ Q (1) 



























































































8(1 + 1) x + 8(0) 8(1 + 1) 8(0) + y 
8(0 + 0) (1 -x) + 8(1) 8(0 + 0) 8(1) + 1-y 
Note: The bold lines represent player's optimal behavior if o> 1/2. Payoffs are evaluated 
from period t 
101 
Simultaneous and Sequential Agreements in Bargaining (Kazu-Hiko Mikami) 
period 0, 2, …, T-2. Suppose that player 1 demands (x, y)キ (1,1). See 
Figure 12. For t=O, 2, …, T-2, 
and 
a I (h * (t) , (x , y) , R) = a lb I h (t + 1)
a I (h*(t),(x,y),AX,Rax) =叫h(t+l) 
a I (h*(t), (x ,Y) ,AX,Aax) =a,w1b I h (t, t+ 1) 
a I (h *(t), (x,y),AY,Ray) =ahb I h (t+l) 
a I (h*(t).(x,y),AY,Aay)=a叫 h(t,t+l) 
a I (h *(t),(x,y),A,Ra) =四Ih(t+l) 
a I (h *(t),(x,y),A,AXa) =a□ h (t,t+l) 
a I (h*(t), (x,y),A,AYa) =a.11b I h (t,t+l) 
てI(h *(t),(x,y),R) =て/blh (t+l) 
てI(h *(t),(x,y),AX,Rax) =てhblh(t) 
てI(h *(t),(x,y),AX,Aax)=てし1/blh(t,t+l)
てI(h *(t),(x,y),AY,Ray) =てhblh(t+l)
r I (h *(t), (x ,y) ,AY,Aay) =て¥1/bI h (t, t+ 1) 
rl(h*(t),(x,y),A,Ra) =てhblh(t+l)
てI(h *(t),(x,y),A,AXa) =てvlbI h (t, t + 1) 
rl (h *(t),(x,y),A,AYa) =て¥1/bI h (t't + l). 
If o>l/2, player 1 chooses Rax(Ray) after player 2 chooses AX(AY). 
If 2o> x+ y,then player 1 chooses Ra after player 2 chooses A. Suppose 
2詮 x+y. Then player 2 chooses Rafter player 1 chooses (x, y). Suppose 
Za<x+y. Then player 2 chooses R if 2o>2-(x+y) and chooses A 
otherwise. But 2a<x+ y and 2oく2-(x+y) are incompatible. Thus 
player 2 chooses Rafter player 1 demands (x, y) if a> 1/2. 
Player 2's deviation from ofi出 ng(0, 0) at Peガodt=l,3,…, T-1: Next 
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Note: The bold lines represent player's optimal behavior if o> 1/2. Payoff are evaluated 
from period t. 
we consider player 2's deviation from offering (x, y) = (0, 0) at period t= 
1, 3, …， T-1. Leth= (h*(t), (x, y)) where x>O and y=O (or x=O and 






al(h ,AX,Aax) =awhlh (t,t+ 1) rl(h ,AX,Aax) = rMhlh (t,t+ 1) 
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al(h ,A,AXa)=aMhlh (t,t+l) rl(h,A,AXa)=□ h (t,t+l) 
al(h,A,AYa)=a叫h(t,t+l) rl(h,A,AYa)=r叫h(t,t+l).
If o> 1/2, player 2 chooses Rax(Ray) after player 1 chooses AX (A Y). 
If 2 o > 2 -(x + y) , then player 2 chooses Ra after player 1 chooses A. Sup-
pose 2 o 2:2-(x + y) . Then player 1 chooses R after player 2 offers (x, y) . 
Suppose 2oく2-(x+y). If 2o>x+y, then player 1 chooses R, and other-
wise chooses A. But Zo<x+ y and 2oく2-(x+ y) are incompatible. Thus 
player 1 chooses R if a> 1/2. 
Consider player l's incentive to deviate at periods 0, 2, …， T-2. Sup・
pose that player 1 demands (1-Ex, 1-cy) to reach an agreement earlier 
than T Player 2 chooses R for such a deviation. If player 2 rejects the 
demand, then player 1 and player 2 chooseびtblh (1) and 1:'tbl h (l), 
respectively. If they play <rtbl h (1) and 1:'tbl h (1), player 1 gets zero payoff 
in the subgame. Thus for player 1 to be willing to delay the bargaining 
for T periods, it need only be thatが (x+y)2:0. 
Consider player 2's incentive to deviate at period 1, 3, …， T-1. Sup-
pose player 2 offers (0+ Ex, O+ c:) at period 1. If player 1 rejects the 
offer, then player 1 and player 2 choose びめIh (2) and 7:',;」h(2), 
respectively. Ifthey play <1t,I h (2) and -rめIh (2), player 2 gets zero payoff 
in the subgame. Thus as long as player 2 gets positive payoff after some 
delay, she does not want to deviate. Q. E. D. 
We have constructed a subgame perfect equilibrium where the 
punishments are very severe. To obtain inefficient equilibria with simul-
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taneous agreement, however, such severe punishments are not necessary. 
For example, suppose that after a deviation, they reach an agreement 
generating utilities 
(0(1~0 十こ）， a( 占＋占））
in case of player l's deviation, and 
（州贔土）,o(~+出））




then both players do not deviate despite such mild punishment. By 
rearranging terms, 
and 





If T=l, 2, then 2-2/(oT-3(1+0))>2/(oT-2(1+0)). Thus there exist 
subgame perfect equilibria involving delay in bargaining until T= 1 or 2. 
Figure 14 depicts the region of (え， y)satisfying the above relations. Delay 
cannot occur for long periods in this case. On the other hand, if we con-
sider severe punishments off the equilibrium path as in the proof of Prop-
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Figure 14: (父， 9)in Mild Punishment Case 
iJ iJ = -i; + 2 - 2 §T-3(1+6) 
ー
i= -x+ 2 0T-2(l+o) 
--------------------:: ー、一ヽ‘ー、一、一ヽ :、翌,_-----------------_ ,_ -------
゜
ー X 
osition 3, the delay could continue for any number of periods as long as 
both players get positive profits for sufficiently large discount factors. 
5. 2 Inefficient Equilibria with Sequential Agreements 
Proposition 4. There exists an inefficient equilibガumwith sequential 
agreement for sufficiently large discount factor. 
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Proof Let戸 bethe period when the players reach agreement on good 
X Let TY be the period when the players reach agreement on good Y 
Without loss of generality, assume T尺 TY,where戸 andTY are even 
numbers. That is, players reach agreements only when player 1 is a 
proposer. (Other possible cases can be argued similarly.) Let h* be the 
path in Figure 15. Along this path player 1 continues to demand (1,1) and 
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player 2 offers (0, 0) until Tx-z and Tx-1, respectively. Both players 
reject the offers during these periods. At yx player 1 demands (x, 1). 
Player 2 accepts the demand (AX) and player 1 accepts player 2's 
acceptance. After Tx, player 2 continues to offer O and player 1 continues 
to demand 1 until period TY -1 and TY -2, respectively. They reject the 
offers during these periods. At period TY player 1 demands y. Player 2 
accepts the demand and player 1 accepts the acceptance. Let h*(t) be the 
above path up to period t. 
Let us check that the above behaviors generate a subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome. That is, we find values of兌and_y that become the 
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. First we construct the (induced) 
strategies on the equilibrium path. Then we specify players'behavior off 
the proposed path of play where every deviation does not pay. 
5. 2. 1 On the equilibrium path 
(1) Players'optimal behavior at Peガodt=O, 2, …, Tx-z: Let <r' 
(h*(t)) = (1, 1). See Figure 16. Consider the following induced strategies 




a I (h*(t), (1, I),AX,Rax) =a11b I h (t+ 1) 
a I (h*(t),(l, I),AX,Aax)=aしllblh(t,t+l)
a I (h*(t), (1, l),AY,Ray) =ahb I h (t+ I) 
a I (h*(t),(l, I),AY,Aay)=aし1/blh(t,t+l)
a I (h *(t), (1, l),A,Ra) =ahb lh(t+l) 
al(h*(t),(1,1),A,AXa) =a叫 h(t,t+l)
a I (h*(t),(l, l),A,AYa) =a¥11b I h (t,t+l) 
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Note: Bold lines represent players'optimal behavior if cS> 1/2. 
rl(h*(t),(1,1),R) ＝て lh*(t+l)
rl (h *(t},(l, l),AX,Rax) =てhblh(t+l)
てI(h *(t),(l, l),AX,Aax)=r111b lh (t,t+l) 
てI(h *(t),(l, l),AY,Ray) =叫h(t+ l) 
rl (h *(t},(l, l),AY,Aay)=てMlbI h(t't + l) 
てl(h*(t),(l,l).A,Ra) =てhblh(t+l)
てI(h *(t),(l, l),A,AXa) =r,11b I h(t,t+l) 
rl(h*(t),(l,l),A,AYa) =て¥/lbI h (t't + l) . 
Ifが>1/2, then player 1 chooses Rax(Ray) after player 2 chooses AX  
(A Y). Because player 2 gets O by AX, A Y and A, player 2 chooses R as 
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long as ,sTX(l-f) + 6竹 (1-y)>O. 
(2) Players'optimal behavior at peガodt=l,3, …, yx -1 : See Figure 
17. Consider the following induced strategies from period t+ 1 
a I (h *(t).(0,0),R) =alh*(t+l) 
a I (h *(t),(0,0),AX,Rax) =叫 h(t+l)
a I (h *(t), (0, 0) ,AX,Aax) =a叫 h(t,t+l) 
a I (h *(t), (0,0),AY,Ray) =a1 I h (t+l) 
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al(h*(t),(0,0),A,AYa) =a.whlh(t,t+l) 
and 
てI(h *(t),(0,0),R) ＝て Ih (t+l) 
てI(h *(t), (0, O),AX,Rax) =rtl h (t+l) 
てI(h *(t), (0, O),AX,Aax)= r.wh I h (t,t+l) 
r I (h *(t),(0,0),AY,Ray) =てtlh(t+l)
てI(h *(t),(0,0),AY,Aay)=r, 叫 h(t,t+l)
てl(h*(t),(0,0),A,Ra) =て,lh(t+l)
てl(h*(t),(0,0),A,AXa) =r.¥lhlh(t,t+l) 
てl(h*(t),(0,0),A,AYa) =てHhI h (t't + l) . 



















































炉 (0+ 0) 5叫）炉+1(1+ 1)炉 +I(中）＋訂(1)
炉 (1+ 1) +訂(i)戸 +1(0+ 0)戸 +I(由）＋戸(0)
戸 (1-x) 
+§Ty (1 -fj) 
Note: Bold lines represent players'optimal behavior if o > (-1 +丘）/2 and x >和O+ol.
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If o>l/2, then player 2 chooses Rax(Ray) after player 1 chooses AX 
(A Y). Because player 1 gets O by AX, A Y and A, player 1 chooses R as 
long as o巧 +a万 >O.
(3) Players'optimal be加viorat period Tふ SeeFigure 18. Let h = 







(2) 1・ 三—period yx + 1 
バ':誓:!芯ーY)i':.,
戸＋炉+2(0) 訂 (!i:)+炉+I(o)
炉 (1-!i:)+炉 +2(1)炉 (1-ら）＋炉+1(1)
Note: Bold lines represent players'optimal behavior. 
甲南経営研究 第43巻第 4号 (2003.3) 
(h*(Tx), (x, 1)). 
a[(h,R)=a』h(Tx+l) rl(h,R)=互blh(TX +l) 
a[(h,AX,Rax) =a,blh (T汗 1) r[(h,AX,Rax)=てlblh(T心 1)
aj(h,AX,Aax) =a[h *(TX, T汗 1) r[(h,AX,Aax)=てlh*(T・X, T汗 1)
al(h,AY,Ray)=叫 h(T汗 1) てl(h,AY,Ray) = r』h(T汗 1)
al(h,AY,Aay) =a1dh (TX, yx +1) rl(h,AY,Aay) =r1dh (TX, yx +l) 
a[(h,A,Ra)=auz[h (Tx+l) てl(h,A,Ra)=て,dh(T汗 1)
a[(h,A,AXa)=a1hblh (TX, yx +l) r[(h,A,AXa)=て1hblh(Tx,T豆 1)
a[(h,A,AYa)=a叫 h(TX,Tx+l) てl(h,A,AYa)=てMhblh(Tx,T汗 1).
If o祁え十 oTYy~O, then player 1 accepts player 2's acceptance AX  If
o>(-1+品）/ 2, then player 1 chooses Ray after player 2 chooses A Y If 
Figure 20: On the Equilibrium Path after period TY 
F.,1 
period T'(_→ ! (1)
(2) 
RY ¥AY  
戸•;:;):•;'.s(,11~Aay 
6叫＋戸+l(O)• J五 +J巧
戸 (1-全）＋炉+1(1) 炉 (1-全）＋訂(1-fl) 
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x>が/(1 + o), then player 1 chooses Aa after player 2 chooses A. Thus if 
x>が/(1 + o) and o > (-1+ [5)/ 2, then player 2 chooses AX  
(4) Players'optimal behavior at peガodyx +I: See Figure 19. Let h = 
(h*(TX+l), 0). 
ol(h,RY)=olh (Tx, rx+2) てl(h,RY)=てlh*(Tx, yx +2) 
al(h,A Y,Ray) =a iulh (Tx, yx +2) rl(h,A Y,Ray) = r.1,tlh (TX, yx +2). 
If y> 0,then player 1 chooses RY 
(5) Players'optimal behavior at PeガodTY after y demanded by playerl: 
See Figure 20. Leth= (h*(Tり， y),
al(h,RY)=a畑tholh(Tx, Ty+ 1) てl(h,RY)=てMhblh(Tx, TY+ 1)
al(h,AY,Ray) =a1blh (TX. TY +l) r!(h,AY,Ray)=r,111blh (Tx, TY +l). 
Player 2 chooses A Y and player 1 accepts the acceptance by player 2. 
5. 2. 2 Off equilibrium path 
Next we consider the induced strategies off the equilibrium path. Con-
struct the following induced strategies for any period until yx -1. 
(6) Player I's deviation from demanding (1, 1) at peガodt=O, 2, …， 
yx -2: Suppose that player 1 demands x<l and y=l (or x=l and y<l, 
or x<I and y<l) at period t. We construct a strategy profile where 
player 1 gets zero payoff after player l's deviation. Thus the structure is 
the same as Figure 12 in section 5 .1. 
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a I (h(t),(x,y),R) =a1bl h (t+l) 
a I (h (t), (x ,y),AX,Rax) =ahb I h (t+l) 
a I (h (t), (x ,y) ,AX,Aax) =aMib I h (t, t+ 1) 
a I (h (t), (x ,y),AY,Ray) =ahb I h (t+l) 




a I (h(t),(x,y) ,A,AXa) =aw1b I h (t,t+l) 
a I (h(t),(x,y),A,AYa) =a.w1b I h (t,t+l) 
てI(h(t),(x,y),R) =てtblh (t+l) 
rl (h(t),(x,y),AX,Rax) =てhblh (t+l) 
てI(h (t), (x ,y) ,AX,Aax) = r叫 h(t,t+l)
てI(h (t),(x,y),AY,Ray) =てhbI h (t+l) 
てI(h (t),(x,y),AY,Aay)=r, しlibI h (t't +I) 
てI(h (t),(x,y),A.Ra) =rhb I h (t+l) 
てI(h (t), (x ,Y) ,A,AXa) = r11b I h (t, t+ 1) 
てI(h (t),(x,y),A,AYa) =r叫 h(t, t+ 1). 
where h (t) =I-h*(t). Player 2 chooses Rafter player l's deviation so that 
player l's deviation does not pay. 
(7) Player 2's deviation from olfeガng(0, 0) at peガodt=l,2,…， yx_ 
1: Given player 1 made offer x= 1 and y= 1 at period t-1, suppose that 
player 2 offers x>O and y=O (or x=O and y>O, or x>O and y>O) at 
period t We construct a strategy profile where player 2 gets zero payoff 
after player 2's deviation. Thus the structure is the same as Figure 13 in 
section 5 .1. 
al (h(t),(x,y),R) =ahlh(t+l) 
a I (h(t),(x,y),AX,Rax) =叫h(t+l)
a I (h(t),(x,y),AX,Aax)=a叫 h(t,t+l)
a I (h (t), (x,y) ,AY,Ray) =叫h(t+l)








てI(h (t), (x ,Y) ,AX.Rax)=叫 h(t+l)
てI(h(t),(x,y),AX,Aax)=叫 h(t,t+l) 
てI(h (t), (x ,y) ,AY,Ray) =叫h(t+l)
てI(h(t),(x,y),AY,Aay)=-r, 叫 h(t,t+l)
てl(h(t),(x,y).A,Ra) =て几 h(t+l) 
てl(h(t),(x,y),A,AXa)=て1/hI h (t't + 1) 
てI(h(t),(x,y),A,AYa) =-r, 叫 h(t,t+l), 
where h(t)キh*(t).Player 1 chooses R. Thus player 2 gets zero payof so 
that the deviation does not pay. 
Next we construct the following strategies for any periods fromぴ to
TY-1. 
(8) Player I's deviation from demanding (x, 1) at peガodTふSuppose
that player 1 demands (x, y)キF(.x,1) at period Tざ Weconstruct a 
strategy profile where player 1 gets zero payoff after player l's deviation. 
Thus the structure is the same as Figure 12. 
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al (h(Tx).(x,y),R) =a 1bl h (yx +l) 
al(h(Tり，(x,y).AX,Rax)=叫h(T汗 1)
al (h(Tり，(x,y),AX,Aax)=a叫 h(Tx, Tx+l) 
a I (h (T'), (x ,Y),AY,Ray) =ahb I h (yx +l) 
a I (h(Tx),(x,y),AY,Aay)=aし1blh (Tx, T汗 1)
al(h(Tx),(x,y),A,Ra) =ahblh(T汗 1)
a I (h (Tx), (x,y),A,AXa) =a.11b I h (yx, yx +l) 




てI(h (Tx),(x,y),AX,Rax) =rhb I h(T□ 1) 
てI(h (Tx),(x,y),AX,Aax)=て¥llblh(TX,T汗 1)
てl(h(T入),(x,y),AY,Ray)=口lh(Tx+l)
てI(h(Tx),(x,y),AY,Aay)=て11bI h(yx , yx + 1) 
Figure 21: Player 2's Deviation from Offering yキ0at Period戸 +1.
>I,!)
• • 
炉 x+炉 +2(0) 8五＋訂+ly
戸 (1―x)+炉+2(1)炉 (1-x) +戸+1(1-y) 
Note: Bold lines represent players'optimal behavior if a> 1/2. 
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Here player 2 chooses R after player l's deviation so that player l's 
deviation does not pay. 
(9) Player 2's deviation from ofi函 ngy=O at period T吐 1:Leth= 
(h*(rx+1), y), where yキ0.See Figure 21. 
al(h,RY)=a叫h(T汗 2) てl(h,RY)=てwhlh(Tx, yx + 2) 
al(h,AY,Ray)=a叫h(Tx,Tx+2) てl(h,AY,Ray)=玩 lh(T". Tx+2) 
If o> l -y, then player 2 chooses Ray after player 1 chooses A Y Sup-
pose a> l -y. Then player 1 chooses RY after player 2's deviation yキ0.
Suppose o < 1 -y. Then player 1 chooses RY ifo > y,and chooses A Y if 
a<y. But a<l-y and a<y are incompatible if o>l/2. Then player 1 
chooses RY after player 2 chooses yキ0.Thus player 2 gets <JTx (l一え） so 
that the deviation does not pay. 
(10) Player l's deviation from demanding y at peガodTY after hおtory
h*(Tり： Leth= (h*(Tり， y),where yキy.See Figure 2. 
al (h,RY) = a wtblh(Tx,Tx + 1) rl(h,RY) = r"11blh(Tx,rr + 1)
al (h,A Y,Ray) = a 1,Mlh(Tx,T汗 1) てl(h,AY,Ray)=•MMlh(TX,TY + 1). 
If o> y,player 1 chooses Ray after player 2 chooses A Y Suppose o> y. 
Then player 2 chooses RY after player 1 proposes yキy.Suppose o<y. 
Then player 2 chooses A Y after player 1 proposes y ifo < 1 -y. But o < y 
and o< 1 -y are incompatible if o> 1/2. Thus player 2 chooses RY after 
player 1 demands y. Thus player 1 gets o巧 sothat the deviation does 
not pay. 
Thus as long as x>O, y>O and the same conditions as in Proposition 3 
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訂 (I-x) +戸+l(O) 記 (1-x) +訂(1-y) 
Note: Bold lines represent players'optimal behavior if o> 1/2. 
hold, h• is a subgame perfect equilibrium path. Q. E. D. 
Notice that the above strategies do not form a unique equilibrium. As 
in the inefficient equilibrium with simultaneous agreement case, we can 
also sometimes use milder punishments off equilibrium paths. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we first have studied the effect of the introduction of 
partial agreements in bargaining with commitments. We have shown that 
the equilibrium is essentially unique. Thus such introduction of partial 
agreements does not influence the equilibrium outcome es淀 ntially.
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Second, we have derived three types of equilibria in bargaining without 
commitments. 
(1) Efficient equilibria: players reach agreements on both goods at 
the beginning. 
(2) Inefficient equilibria with simultaneous agreements: players 
reach agreements on both goods after some delay. 
(3) Inefficient equilibria with sequential agreements: players reach 
agreements one by one after delay. 
Type(1) is just an extension of Muthoo (1990) to two-good 
bargaining. Type (2) is just an extension of Fernandez and Glazer 
(1991) to two-good bargaining although they consider only the effect of 
rejection of the opponent's decision by only one player (strike there). 
Type(3) is new to this model. Notice that al three types of the equilib-
rium arise in the same model. 
The constructions of the equilibria depend heavily on the structure of 
the bargaining procedure. The introduction of no commitments enables 
us to derive multiple equilibria. It allows players to execute a punishment 
against a deviation from a certain equilibrium path. 
We have not derived al equilibria because their number can be 
enormous. Only some equilibrium have been derived. It does not make 
sense to claim which of these are more appropriate without additional 
considerations. 
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